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Abstract 
This paper tries to assess the short-run effect of the newly enacted double policy in China which 
is designed to promote new energy vehicles. The policy has been divided into its three main 
components, the fuel consumption score constraint, the new energy score constraint, and the 
remedial mechanism, and they are studied separately. Three models, the one-company model, the 
two-company model, and the two-company-two-car model, have been developed in an effort to 
explore the impact of the policy on automakers’ sales mixed. It turns out that in all three models, 
we are unable to rule out the possibility that the policy may not necessarily force car producers to 
produce more new energy vehicles and less traditional energy vehicles in order to maximize their 
profit. The result will depend on the specific value of the product term !"!#, which is related to 
the cross elasticity of car demand. More findings are made about how companies actually behave 
in the model when facing the policy by comparing with the control group.  
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1. Introduction 
The carbon dioxide (CO2) level in the atmosphere has been continuously increasing in 
recent years. As the largest (CO2) emitter in the world, producing one quarter of the world’s total 
CO2 in 2013 and making up three-quarters of the growth in global CO2 emission from 2010 to 
2012 (Liu 2016), China has long been searching for strategies to regulate and control its CO2 
release. Relevant policies of mitigation have been focusing on the transportation sector in 
particular, given that it is one of the major sources of carbon emission, and also due to the country’s 
15% annual compound growth rate of passenger car sales from 2011 to 2015, according to National 
Bureau of Statistics of China (2017). 
This paper studies the double score policy enacted by Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology of China in 2017, which is designed to promote the new energy vehicle (NEV), an 
alternative to the traditional energy vehicle (TEV), by introducing a virtual double score system 
(MIITPRC 2017). The NEV uses electricity, oxygen and hydrogen as fuel, therefore making it 
possible for the transportation sector to reduce CO2 emission. However, it incurs more production 
costs and brings fewer profits at the current stage than TEV at the same time.  
The purpose of this paper is to establish theoretical models to explore the short-run effect 
of the double score policy. Specifically, this paper wants to study whether the policy will help 
change automakers’ sales mix, driving them to produce more NEV even though it is thought to be 
less beneficial. Since the policy went into effect very recently, it is reasonable to have such a 
preliminary economic assessment. Additionally, there are two general assumptions for this paper. 
First, a short-run assessment means that there is not enough time for companies to innovate their 
technology to reach a higher fuel economy. Second, there is no interaction between companies 
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other than score trading. This paper will also examine the policy in isolation, while in reality, many 
policies for NEV may exist concurrently and have mutual influences.  
The rules and definitions of the policy that are essential to the paper’s modeling are offered 
in Section 2. Section 3 reviews the literature of similar automobile market regulations such as the 
US CAFE policy. In Section 4, 5, and 6, three different models are presented. A one-company 
model is demonstrated in Section 4, where that company sells one type of NEV and one type of 
TEV. In Section 5 there is a two-company model. Specifically, one automaker is producing NEV 
and the other is making TEV. Finally, Section 6 combines the two models in previous sections and 
demonstrates a model where two firms both produce TEV and NEV, but with different marginal 
costs. Section 7 will be conclusions.  
2. Policy 
There are 3 major components of the virtual double score system the policy brings: the fuel 
consumption score (FCS), the new energy score (NES), and the remedial mechanism.  
FCS assesses the fuel efficiency of automobiles. There are two values being measured for 
the score: the corporate average fuel consumption target value ($%&'%) and the corporate average 
fuel consumption value (CAFC). The calculation of $%&'%  for a given car manufacturer is given 
by: 
$%&'% = )*×,*-*./0                                                           (1) 
where N is the total number of model types1 this automaker will produce in a given year, Ti (L/100 
km) is the fixed fuel consumption target value2 for vehicle model i, qi is the corresponding 
                                                
1 Car models with different fuels will be counted as different models, even though they may appear the same. 
2 The fixed value of Ti is determined by the car model’s complete vehicle kerb mass (CM), namely the weight 
of a car and all necessary accessories on it, as well as the number of rows of seats (whether it is greater than or 
equal to two). 
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production quantity of model i, and Q = 23435"  is the company’s total output. In general, $%&'%  
is the sales-weighted average target value of fuel economy that a car company is required to reach.  
Meanwhile, the computation of CAFC is given by: 
CAFC = '%*×,*-*./ ,*-*./ ×9*                                                           (2) 
where FCi (L/100 km) is the actual fuel consumption of vehicle type i, Wi is a multiplier3 for 
qualified NEV models and will be equal to 1 for fuel inefficient TEV models. Altogether, CAFC 
is the actual value of the sales-weighted fuel consumption for that car factory. The fuel 
consumption score is the difference between TCAFC and CAFC times the firm’s total output in a 
model year: FCS = $%&'% − CAFC ×<                                                  (3) 
NES, on the other hand, focuses on the new energy vehicles. A car producer will earn 
certain amount of score4 for every NEV that it produces. Its total new energy score is therefore: NES = ?3×23435"                                                         (4) 
where ?3  represents the unit new energy score for model i and will be 0 if that model uses 
traditional energy.  
The policy further sets value constraints for both FCS and NES. The fuel consumption 
score constraint requires that every company must earn a non-negative FCS, while according to 
the new energy score constraint, NES for every car manufacturer has to reach a pre-determined 
percentage, denoted by M5, of the corporation’s total TEV output (<)@A). If firms fail to reach the 
                                                
3 For NEV with one time travel distance using solely clean energy greater or equal to 50 km (R >= 50), Wi will 
be equal to 5. 
4 Every Hybrid power car will earn 2 points. Each pure electricity vehicle will earn 0.012×R+0.8 (same R as 
footnote 3). The unit score for fuel cell passenger cars is 0.16×P, with P (kW) being the measurement of cell 
efficiency. 
5 Effective for companies with an TEV output of more than 30,000 cars per year only, the percentage values 
are 10% and 12% for 2019 and 2020, respectively. 
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goals, they are able to take advantage of the remedial mechanism, which is the third part of the 
double score policy. For FCS, the remedial mechanism holds that an automaker may offset its 
negative part by adopting one or more of the following ways: 
1) Use own company’s banked fuel consumption score from previous years. 
2) Use the score from affiliated corporations. 
3) Buy NES from other companies. 
4) Use the surplus NES from own company after meet the new energy score constraint. 
Among them, the first method will not be considered, because it violates the first basic assumption. 
When calculating scores from early years, a discount rate will be applied and the problem will 
change into a long-run assessment. The second method will also be excluded since it goes against 
the second basic assumption that no other interaction between firms is allowed. 
On the other hand, the lacking NES can only be compensated by purchasing NES from 
other companies. 
As a result, after taking the remedial mechanism into consideration one can form two 
constraints, which will be used in our models for later sections, from the double score policy: NES + DEFGHI_" ≥ L<)@A                                                 (5a) FCS + NES + DEFGHI_" − L<)@A + DEFGHI_# ≥ 0                    (5b) 
where DEFGHI_" and DEFGHI_# are new energy scores that the firm buy from other companies in 
order to meet the new energy score constraint and the fuel consumption score, respectively. The 
remaining NES after fulfilling the new energy constraint, if any, can also be used to compensate 
the negative FCS value. 
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It is noteworthy that in the remedial mechanism, NES cannot be saved for future use but 
has no limitation for trading. In contrast, FCS, which can be banked, is not available in the 
transaction market.  
3. Literature Review 
Since the double score policy was implemented just a few months ago, the previous 
research of this policy is relatively rare. However, we are able to make an analogy to the corporate 
average fuel economy (CAFE) regulation in United States. Enacted firstly in 1975, this policy sets 
a minimum standard of the fuel efficiency for passenger cars and light trucks that each 
manufacturer is required to meet, thus playing a similar role to the double score policy and in 
particular serving a similar function to the fuel consumption score.  
The first set of papers focuses on the supply side of the market. Kwoka (1983) builds a 
model predicting the short-run pricing behavior of a single company under the CAFE constraint, 
with only two car models being sold in the market. According to his model, by employing prices 
that decrease the sales of low MPG cars and increase the sales of high MPG cars, the merchant is 
able to meet the policy requirement. Greene (1991), while focusing on the pricing strategies for 
manufacturers when there is no inter-firm interaction, indicates that the effectiveness of changing 
sales mix will be small compared to that of technology updating, if condition permits. Liu et al. 
(2014) adopt models based on Greene’s, and come up with the similar conclusion. They also 
investigate the impact of fee-bate policies on fuel economy improvement. Rubin et al. (2009) focus 
on the fuel economy strategy that is allowable to trade. One can make connection of that with the 
remedial mechanism in the double score policy. They find that the greatest potential cost savings 
from tightening the CAFE standard occur when the score system has the greatest flexibility, 
allowing both trading among firms and among different vehicle classes. Anderson et al. (2011) 
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also study the compliance cost for car manufacturers when CAFE policy becomes stricter. They 
model the profit-maximization function of firms based on an oligopolistic market structure and 
then add constraints brought by CAFE regulation. Additionally, the authors obtain the shadow 
price of compliance by calculating the cost for companies to exploit a loophole within the policy. 
Jacobson (2013) addresses the problem of heterogeneity among companies and takes the used car 
into consideration as well. 
The second set of papers focuses on the demand side of the market. Goldberg (1998) uses 
a discrete choice model of vehicle demand as well as a continuous model of vehicle utilization, 
while Liu et al. (2014) introduce the nested multinomial logit model in order to compute the 
consumer surplus.  
The theoretical models of this paper will be built upon the supply side work, especially 
Kwoka’s model. Improvements and extensions will be made to adjust the model to be in accord 
with the conditions of the double score policy. 
4. One-company Model 
First, the one-company model is employed. Specifically, we would like to pay attention to 
only one vehicle firm, and there are only two types of cars being sold by the company: one 
traditional energy vehicle and one new energy vehicle. The advantage of this model is that we can 
clearly evaluate the effects of the constraints and the remedial mechanism from the policy by 
comparing the two cases, one when the policy is implemented and one when it is not. The later 
one is considered to be the control group. Moreover, the constraints and the mechanism will be 
studied separately. 
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In addition to the two general assumptions mentioned in Section 1, there are several more. 
The demand curves for both vehicle types are fixed. They are linear and each can be written as a 
function of its own price and quantity as well as the price of its counterpart: N3 = 	α3 −	Q323 +	!3NR		i, j = 1,2		i ≠ j                                            (6) 
Note that constants α3, Q3 and !3 are all positive. It is intuitively reasonable since the price and 
quantity of the same item has a negative relationship, and the prices of substitute goods are 
positively related, while α3 is related to the unchangeable technology. We denote TEV as 1 and 
NEV as 2. The setting is similar to that in Kwoka (1983). Furthermore, we assume that the only 
cost for producing a car is the variable cost, as denoted by vc1 and vc2, respectively. As a result, 
the profit function of the firm is given by: π = 	N"2" +	N#2# −	Z["2" −	Z[#2#                                               (7) 
In that case, for the control group, the optimal car quantities when both the constraints and the 
remedial mechanism are not implemented are derived by calculating the first order condition of π 
in terms of q1 and q2: 
 2"∗ = ]/^_/`a∗bcd/#e/                                                            (8a) 2#∗ = ]a^_a`/∗bcda#ea                                                           (8b) 
Additionally, by combining formulas (6) and (8) and solving the four equations 
simultaneously, one can determine the equilibrium prices and quantities for both TEV and NEV: 2"∗ = #]/^_/]a^ _/_ab# cd/^_/cdae/(gb_/_a)                                               (9a) N"∗ = #]/^_/]a^#cd/^_/cdagb_/_a                                                    (9b) 2#∗ = _a]/^#]a^_acd/^(_/_ab#)cdaea(gb_/_a)                                               (9c) 
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N#∗ = _a]/^#]a^_acd/^#cdagb_/_a                                                   (9d) 
These equilibrium values are all expressed in terms of exogenous constants. Note that even though 
all the constants on the right-hand side are fixed, equations (9) still indicate some restrictions of 
their values. The non-negativity of the prices, quantities and constants imply that the product of  !"!# has to be less or equal to 4, otherwise equations (9b) and (9d) will be negative. 
In the next phase, we include the fuel consumption score constraint as well as the new 
energy score constraint into the model. As mentioned before, FCS is designed to force the company 
to produce fuel efficient cars. NES, whose requirement is proportional to the company’s TEV 
output, ensures that in order for an automaker to enlarge its production, usually tradition gasoline-
based automobiles, it must manufacture more NEV as well. Note that for now the remedial 
mechanism is temporarily not considered. As a result, for the fuel consumption score constraint, 
after applying the model scenario, the constraint is given by:  FCS = )/,/^)a,a,/^,a −	'%/,/^'%a,a9/,/^9a,a (2" + 2#) ≥ 	0                                (10a) 
Note that without remedial mechanism, NES is not applicable in satisfying the fuel consumption 
score constraint. Here $" and $# are the corporate average fuel consumption target values for TEV 
and NEV, respectively. h?" is the actual fuel consumption level for TEV, while we assume NEV, 
ideally independent of fossil fuel, has a FC2 value of 0. As discussed in Section 2, the W1 value 
will be 1 for TEV, and we further assume that W2 is equal to 1, because this will greatly simplify 
the calculation by canceling out the denominator while mostly comply with the policy, since it still 
shows the different weights of TEV and NEV in satisfying the fuel consumption constraint. 
Therefore, the altered version of the fuel consumption constraint will be: FCS = $"2" + $#2# − h?"2" 	≥ 	0                                        (10b) 
At the same time, the new energy score constraint, when DEFGHI_" is equal to 0, is given by: 
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NES = ?#2# ≥ L2"                                                     (11) 
where L represents the fraction value, and is a constant between 0 and 1 (inclusive). The firm 
must earn more new energy score, which is the product of the unit score ?# and the NEV quantity 2#, than L portion of the TEV quantity 2".  
Adding the constraints into the model, the Lagrange function of the firm is given as: L = N"(2", N#)2" +	N#(2#, N")2# −	Z["2" −	Z[#2# + j" $"2" + $#2# − h?"2" + j#(?#2# − L2")                                 (12) 
However, after reorder the two constraints, equation (10b) becomes: 
 2# ≥ '%/b)/)a 2"                                                       (13) 
and equation (11) turns into: 
 2# ≥ k%a 2"                                                          (14) 
This automatically implies that both constraints require the NEV quantity to reach certain share of 
the company’s total production by setting 2# to be greater than or equal to certain ratio of 2", even 
although that is not the original purpose of the fuel consumption score constraint. This shows that 
the constraints of FCS and NES, though designed to have distinct uses, are actually analogous and 
will have similar effects on the automaker’s sales mix, with the only difference being the value of 
ratio. Furthermore, the two ratio values, '%/b)/)a  and k%a, are determined by constants from the policy, 
which means that whether constraint 1 or constraint 2 is binding will not depend on firm’s choice. 
The result is intuitively reasonable as both constraints are linear. In fact, we can conclude that the 
same solution should apply to any policy that imposes a linear constraint on the fraction of NEV 
vehicles produced. 
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As a result, given the similarity of the two constraints, we would like to set M to be 0, 
which assumes the new energy score constraint to be always unbinding, because excluding the 
new energy score constraint will largely simplify the calculation as no repetitive discussion is 
needed. This new assumption is also justified by the following reasons. First, according to the 
policy, the constraint does not apply to all car producers. Only corporations with a total output 
greater than 30,000 cars per year will be included (MIITPRC 2017). Furthermore, the constraint 
will not come into practice until the year 2019, so currently in 2018 M is equal to 0. 
Back to equation (12), the unbinding new energy score constraint implies that $"2" +$#2# − h?"2" = 0 and j# = 0. To achieve the best solution, in this case, we can solve the first 
order condition with regard to 2", 2#, and j". The optimal solutions 2"∗∗ and 2#∗∗ are derived as: 2"∗∗ = ]/^_/`a∗∗bcd/ ^l(]a^_a`/∗∗bcda)#(e/^eala)                                        (15a) 2#∗∗ = m ]/^_/`a∗∗bcd/ ^l(]a^_a`/∗∗bcda)#(e/^eala)                                      (15b) 
where R = '%/b)/)a  is the ratio between 2"∗∗ and 2#∗∗ when the company tries to conform the fuel 
consumption score requirement. It represents the level of hardness for the automaker to comply 
with the constraint. When the fuel consumption target value T1 or T2 are small, R value will be 
large, meaning that it has to produce relatively more NEV. Intuitively, this implies that the 
influences of the constraint will increase when its standard is tightened. At the same time, it is 
noteworthy that the equations (15) have exactly the same form as the optimal result in Kwoka’s 
model analyzing CAFE constraint (1983), except that the ratio value R has a different expression6. 
The reason for this discrepancy comes from the different setups of the two policies. In CAFE 
regulation, there is a uniform standard for the fuel economy for all types of cars, which is derived 
                                                
6 In Kwoka’s research, the ratio R = (obp/pabo)(pap/), which is also determined by constants. 
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by the harmonic mean of each vehicle’s fuel MPG value. As for the fuel consumption score, 
however, each type of car has its own target consumption value, and in calculation the sales-
weighted arithmetic mean is employed. 
Furthermore, just like the derivation of equations (9), one can solve simultaneously the first 
order conditions with respect to the vehicle quantities and the firm’s demand functions of equation 
(6) to calculate the equilibrium point of prices and quantities in terms of exogenous constants: 2"∗∗ = #]/^_/]a^ _/_ab# cd/^_/cda^ _/_ab# q/ '%/b)/ b_/q/)ae/(gb_/_a)                          (16a) N"∗∗ = #]/^_/]a^#cd/^_/cda^#q/ '%/b)/ b_/q/)agb_/_a                                   (16b) 2#∗∗ = _a]/^#]a^_acd/^ _/_ab# cda^_aq/ '%/b)/ b _/_ab# q/)aea(gb_/_a)                          (16c) N#∗∗ = _a]/^#]a^_acd/^#cda^_aq/ '%/b)/ b#q/)agb_/_a                                     (16d) 
One can then directly subtract 2"∗ , N"∗ , 2#∗ , and N#∗  (equations (9)) from 2"∗∗ , N"∗∗ , 2#∗∗ , and N#∗∗ 
(equations (16)) and study the signs to discover any changes within the company’s optimal sales 
mix: 2"∗∗ − 2"∗ = _/_ab# q/ '%/b)/ b_/q/)ae/(gb_/_a)                                         (17a) N"∗∗ − N"∗ = #q/ '%/b)/ b_/q/)agb_/_a                                              (17b) 2#∗∗ − 2#∗ = _aq/ '%/b)/ b _/_ab# q/)aea(gb_/_a)                                         (17c) N#∗∗ − N#∗ = _aq/ '%/b)/ b#q/)agb_/_a                                              (17d) 
The signs of equation (17a) and equation (17c) actually depend on specific values of constants on 
the right-hand side and hence are uncertain. As a result, the fuel consumption constraint will not 
force the firm to change its sales mix to one absolute direction. In fact, the result can further be 
divided into 2 cases, given that !"!# < 4 . First, when 0 < !"!# < 2 , the term !"!# −
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2 j" h?" − $"  and the term !"!# − 2 j"$#	will both be less than zero. Hence, the sign of 
equation (17a) will become strictly negative and the sign of equation (17c) will be strictly positive, 
showing that the company is always going to produce less TEV and more NEV to meet the 
constraint while maximize its profit. In this case, the fuel consumption constraint is effective in 
promoting the NEV while restricting the TEV. Second, when 2 < !"!# < 4, the two associated 
terms mentioned above will now turn to be positive, causing the signs of the two equations to be 
ambiguous. However, if both !" and !# have values that are between 2 and 2, the term !"!# − 2 
will always be larger than either !" or !#, indicating that the negative term is more weighted for 
equation (17a), while the positive term is more weighted for equation (17c). 
Apparently, the result is related with the cross elasticity of demand, which is the 
responsiveness of one product’s quantity facing a change in price of the other products. From the 
equations (6) we can express the demand cross elasticity of the two car models as _/e/ and _aea, 
respectively. 
In contrast, in Kwoka’s paper (1983), he examines the effect of CAFE regulation by 
subtracting equations (8) from equations (15), instead of (9) from (16), and derives an absolutely 
negative value for difference in TEV quantities and absolutely positive value for difference in 
NEV quantities. He thus concludes that the CAFE constraint will always drive the company to 
change its price strategy to sale less TEV and more NEV in the market, in order to follow the 
regulation. However, such method might be problematic, for the two optimal prices, N"∗∗	and N"∗, 
are different and hence cannot be subtracted directly. 
Finally, we employ the remedial mechanism into the model, which is what the firm can do 
if they earn a negative FCS7. Furthermore, for this model, since there is only one company being 
                                                
7 The new energy score constraint will always be fulfilled if the percentage M is 0. 
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studied, we are unable to study both the buyer and the seller of the positive new energy score. Thus, 
for the one-company model it is assumed that the company can use its own new energy score as 
the only way of the remedial mechanism to offset its negative FCS. As a result, the new fuel 
consumption score constraint is now written as: FCS + NES = 	$"2" + $#2# −	h?"2" + ?#2# ≥ 0                               (18) 
Reorder the constraint yields: 2# ≥ '%/b)/)a^%a 2"                                                        (19) 
Again, the expression is still linear and we expect it to have similar effect. However, note that the 
ratio value '%/b)/)a^%a  is smaller than '%/b)/)a  in equation (13) by adding a positive constant ?# into the 
denominator. This reflects that the constraint becomes easier to satisfy when firm is able to use 
NES to compensate the negative FCS. 
5. Two-company Model 
In this section, the two-company model is adopted, where there are two firms, one 
producing only TEV and one manufacturing only NEV. Under this condition, firms are able to 
take advantage of the third method from the remedial mechanism, which is purchasing NES from 
other car producers. Automatically, the TEV company becomes the score buyer and the NEV one 
becomes the score seller. The fourth method discussed in Section 4, on the other hand, turns 
insignificant in this section, because for the firm that manufactures solely TEV, it is unable to use 
its own new energy score, while for its counterpart, the NEV company is not facing any constraints 
from the policy by making only NEV. Moreover, just like the last model, the control group will be 
when the policy is not implemented, and the demand functions for the two types of vehicles will 
also remain the same. As a result, denoting the TEV company as firm 1 and NEV company as firm 
2, we can write their respective profit functions in the control group as follow: 
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π" = (α" −	Q"2" +	!"N#)2" −	Z["2"                                        (20a) π# = 	 (α# −	Q#2# +	!#N")2# −	Z[#2#                                       (20b) 
One can compute the equilibrium of quantities and prices by getting the first order condition of q1 
and q2, respectively, and then solving simultaneously with the demand functions: 2"t∗ = #]/^_/]a^ _/_ab# cd/^_/cdae/(gb_/_a)                                               (21a) N"t∗ = #]/^_/]a^#cd/^_/cdagb_/_a                                                    (21b) 2#t∗ = _a]/^#]a^_acd/^(_/_ab#)cdaea(gb_/_a)                                               (21c) N#t∗ = _a]/^#]a^_acd/^#cdagb_/_a                                                   (21d) 
Note that the expressions of 2"t∗, N"t∗, 2#t∗, and	N#t∗ are exactly the same as those of equations (9). 
That’s because the two control groups yield the same first order condition. 
Next, we can derive the companies’ new profit functions when we apply the double score 
policy: π" = (α" −	Q"2" +	!"N#)2" −	Z["2" −	Nu(h?" − $")2"                      (22a) π# = (α# −	Q#2# +	!#N")2# −	Z[#2# +	Nu?#2#                              (22b) 
where Nu is the price of score in the market, if we assume it to be fixed and already reach the 
equilibrium state. For firm 1, the term −	Nu(h?" − $")2" reflects the total extra cost that company 
has to bear in order to satisfy the fuel consumption score. Notice that this term is linked with the 
quantity of TEV, and thus automatically serve as a constraint for company 1. In contrast, the term Nu?#2# for firm 2 is the added benefits generated by producing NEV, for C2 is the unit new energy 
score. As a result, by solving the first order condition of the two equations each, along with the 
unchanged demand functions from equations (6), one is able to compute the exogenous expression 
of the constrained scenario: 
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2"v∗ = #]/^_/]a^ _/_ab# cd/^_/cda^ _/_ab# `w '%/b)/ b_/`w%ae/(gb_/_a)                          (23a) N"v∗ = #]/^_/]a^#cd/^_/cda^#`w '%/b)/ b_/`w%agb_/_a                                    (23b) 2#v∗ = _a]/^#]a^_acd/^ _/_ab# cda^_a`w '%/b)/ b _/_ab# `w%aea(gb_/_a)                          (23c) N#v∗ = _a]/^#]a^_acd/^#cda^_a`w '%/b)/ b#`w%agb_/_a                                     (23d) 
Subtracting equations (21) from equations (23) will show the shift of two automakers’ optimal 
production decision before and after the policy: 2"v∗ − 2"t∗ = _/_ab# `w '%b)/ b_/`w%ae/(gb_/_a)                                         (24a) N"v∗ − N"t∗ = #`w '%/b)/ b_/`w%agb_/_a                                              (24b) 2#v∗ − 2#t∗ = _a`w '%/b)/ b _/_ab# `w%aea(gb_/_a)                                         (24c) N#v∗ − N#t∗ = _a`w '%/b)/ b#`w%agb_/_a                                              (24d) 
The result turns out to be similar as the one-company model. Again, if 0 < !"!# < 2, 
equation (24a) will always be negative and equation (24c) will always be positive, given that all 
constants on the right-hand side are positive. Even if 2 < !"!# < 4, the term !"!# − 2 will still be 
smaller than each of !"  and !#  when the difference between the two is small, thus making !"!# − 2 Nu h? − $"  and !"!# − 2 Nu?# small enough to keep signs unchanged for the two 
equations. In these cases, the double score policy will force firm 1 to produce less TEV and firm 
2 to make more NEV to reach the new equilibrium, and is thus considered to be effective. 
Nevertheless, just like those of equations (17), the signs of equation (24a) and equation (24c) are 
not strictly fixed, and will be depend on the specific values of exogenous constants. 
Furthermore, comparing equations (17) and equations (24), one will find that Nu takes the 
place of j" , which is the Lagrange multiplier. This implies that for the optimal situation, the 
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marginal cost for companies to reach a stricter fuel economy target is the marginal value of the 
score. The result also indicates that the remedial mechanism continues acting as a tool to relax the 
constraint, as previously unqualified automaker now has the chance to compete in the market. 
6. Two-company-two-car Model 
Finally, the two-company-two-car model will be studied in this section. As the name 
suggests, there will be two companies in the automobile market, both producing TEV and NEV. 
In addition, firm 2, now considered to be a high-tech automaker, will have a comparative advantage 
on NEV over firm 1, while the two will be identical in TEV manufacture. As before, the two firms 
need to change their sales mix and take advantage of the remedial mechanism as well to meet the 
fuel consumption constraint. Here in this model, they can use both their own NES and NES 
purchased from the market. As before, the control group for this model will be the situation when 
there is no policy. 
The demand functions for each type of car is now given by: N" = 	α" −	Q"(2"" + 2"#) +	!"N#                                                (25a) N# = 	α# −	Q#(2#" + 2##) +	!#N"                                               (25b) 
where 23R refers to the quantity of car type i produced by firm j. Note that the value of α, Q, and ! 
will be the same as previous models, meaning that the two firms still have the same demand 
functions. 
Furthermore, to reflect the comparative advantage on NEV, we set firm 1’s unit cost of 
NEV to be higher than that of firm 2, and equalize the variable cost of TEV for the two firms. 
Hence, the profit functions of the control group can be written as: π" = 	N"2"" + N#2#" −	Z["2"" − Z[#"2#"                                       (26a) π# = 	N"2"# + N#2## −	Z["2"# − Z[##2##                                       (26b) 
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Z[#" > Z[##                                                            (26c) 
Solving the first order condition of equation (26a) and equation (26b) with respect to 
vehicle quantities, and adding equations (25) into the equation set, one can get six equations in 
total and six unknown variables 2"", 2#", 2"#, 2##, N", and N#. Calculating them simultaneously 
will generate the exogenous expression for these variables: 2""y∗ = z]/^_/]a^ _/_abz cd/^_/cda/^_/cdaae/({b_/_a)                                         (27a) 2"#y∗ = z]/^_/]a^ _/_abz cd/^_/cda/^_/cdaae/({b_/_a)                                         (27b) N"y∗ = z]/^_/]a^vcd/^_/cda/^_/cdaa{b_/_a                                               (27c) 2#"y∗ = _a]/^z]a^#_acd/^ _/_abv cda/^zcdaaea({b_/_a)                                        (27d) 2##y∗ = _a]/^z]a^#_acd/^zcda/^ _/_abv cdaaea({b_/_a)                                        (27e) N#y∗ = _a]/^z]a^#_acd/^zcda/^zcdaa{b_/_a                                               (27f) 
It is noteworthy that 2#"y∗ − 2##y∗ = _/_ab{ cda/^ {b_/_a cdaaea {b_/_a = cdaabcda/ea < 0. This indicates that at 
equilibrium state, firm 2 will dominate the NEV production by having a comparative advantage 
on it. Meanwhile, 2""y∗ − 2"#y∗ = 0 shows that the two firms are identical in terms of TEV, given that 
they have the same marginal cost. Furthermore, the restriction on !"!# is still valid, since 9 − !"!# 
will be strictly positive if !"!# < 4. 
Subsequently, after applying the double score policy, one will get the Lagrange formula 
for each firm: L" = N"2"" + N#2#" −	Z["2"" − Z[#"2#" − Nu?# 2p" − 2#" + } 	$"2"" + $#2#" − h?"2"" + ?#2p"                                         (28a) L# = N"2"# + N#2## −	Z["2"# − Z[##2## − Nu?# 2p# − 2## + 
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} 	$"2"# + $#2## − h?"2"# + ?#2p#                                         (28b) ?#2p" and ?#2p# are the amount of NES firm 1 and firm 2 need to buy, respectively, and they can 
be viewed as the amount of score obtained by producing 2p" and 2p# NEV. On the other hand, ?#2#"  and ?#2##  are the two firms’ own new energy score. Here we assume that firms will 
automatically sell all of their new energy score at first and then buy the score from the market to 
offset all of its negative fuel consumption score. As a result, if 2pR is larger than 2#R, firm j will 
be a score buyer, since its own new energy score is not enough for the remedial mechanism. On 
the contrary, if 2pR is less than 2#R, then it becomes a score seller. All the score trading will be at 
the price Nu, which is assumed to be exogenous and reach its equilibrium.  
Similarly, one is able to derive the exogenous expression by computing the first order 
conditions8 and solving the simultaneous equations: 2""~∗ = z]/^_/]a^ _/_abz cd/^_/cda/^_/cdaa^ _/_abz `w '%/b)/ b#_/`w(%a^)a)e/({b_/_a)                (29a) 2"#~∗ = z]/^_/]a^ _/_abz cd/^_/cda/^_/cdaa^ _/_abz `w '%/b)/ b#_/`w(%a^)a)e/({b_/_a)                (29b) N"~∗ = z]/^_/]a^vcd/^_/cda/^_/cdaa^v`w '%/b)/ b#_/`w(%a^)a){b_/_a                          (29c) 2#"~∗ = _a]/^z]a^#_acd/^ _/_abv cda/^zcdaa^#_a`w '%/b)/ b _/_abz `w(%a^)a)ea({b_/_a)               (29d) 2##~∗ = _a]/^z]a^#_acd/^zcda/^ _/_abv cdaa^#_a`w '%/b)/ b _/_abz `w(%a^)a)ea({b_/_a)               (29e) N#~∗ = _a]/^z]a^#_acd/^zcda/^zcdaa^#_a`w '%/b)/ bv`w(%a^)a){b_/_a                           (29f) 
                                                
8 Apart from the normal partial derivatives over vehicle quantities, one is also required to calculate Ä/,Å/ and  Äa,Åa, and set them to zero. These will lead to the equation Nu = }, the same conclusion as Section 5. One then 
replace the Lagrange multiplier by the score price when deriving the exogenous expressions. 
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Subtracting equations (27) from (29) will yield the change of firms’ sales mix in term of fixed 
constants: 2""~∗ − 2""y∗ = _/_abz `w '%/b)/ b#_/`w(%a^)a)e/({b_/_a)                                   (30a) 2"#~∗ − 2"#y∗ = _/_abz `w '%/b)/ b#_/`w(%a^)a)e/({b_/_a)                                  (30b) N"~∗ − N"y∗ = v`w '%/b)/ b#_/`w(%a^)a){b_/_a                                       (30c) 2#"~∗ − 2#"y∗ = #_a`w '%/b)/ b _/_abz `w(%a^)a)ea({b_/_a)                                  (30d) 2##~∗ − 2##y∗ = #_a`w '%/b)/ b _/_abz `w(%a^)a)ea({b_/_a)                                  (30e) N#~∗ − N#y∗ = #_a`w '%/b)/ bv`w(%a^)a){b_/_a                                      (30f) 
Notice that equations (30a) and (30b) are the same. Equations (30d) and (30e) are also identical, 
showing that the quantities of the same type of car will increase or decrease by the same amount 
when the policy is implemented, regardless of the company. This implies that the difference of the 
optimal quantities of NEV produced by company 1 and company 2 are all caused by their different 
marginal costs, and the policy will not have any additional influence. One reason for such a result 
comes from the setting of the model. Specifically, by employing Lagrange function, we assume 
the fuel consumption constraint to be binding for both automakers. The two firms are actually 
facing the same constraint, as can be seen from equations (28). If firm 2, producing more NEV 
than firm 1, actually turns the fuel consumption constraint into unbinding, the difference of the 
sales mixes between the two companies may experience additional changes. 
Moreover, by examining the specific signs of equations (30), one is able to know the 
policy’s effect on different car types. Here the result will still be analogues to the previous two. 
Generally, when the term !"!# is small enough, equations (30a) and (30b) will turn absolutely 
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negative, while equations (30d) and (30e) will come to be strictly positive, yielding a conclusion 
that is intuitively reasonable. When !"!# is large, the signs will become uncertain, even though it 
is still likely for the outcome to remain the same. However, compared to the previous two models, 
the term !"!# − 2  changes into !"!# − 3 , and the terms !" , !#  are now 2!" , 2!#  in the 
numerator for this case, indicating a higher probability for companies to produce more NEV and 
less TEV. 
Finally, we would like to derive the specific value of 2p" and 2p# to determine the role 
these two firms play in the score trading market. Since the fuel consumption constraint is binding, 
we can express 2p" and 2p# using the optimal quantities of cars: ?#2p" = h?" − $" 2""~∗ − $#2#"~∗                                           (31a) ?#2p# = h?" − $" 2"#~∗ − $#2##~∗                                           (31b) 
Subtracting ?#2#"~∗ one both sides of equation (31a), and ?#2##~∗ for equation (31b), plus using the 
two relations 2""~∗ = 2"#~∗, 2#"~∗ − 2##~∗ = cdaabcda/ea , one will get: ?#(2p" − 2#"~∗) = h?" − $" 2""~∗ − ($# + ?#)2#"~∗                                (32a) ?#(2p# − 2##~∗) = h?" − $" 2""~∗ − ($# + ?#)(2#"~∗ + cda/bcdaaea )                   (32b) 
Note that equation (32b) will always be smaller than equation (32a). As a result, if h?" − $" 2""~∗ − ($# + ?#)2#"~∗  is negative, then both two firms will be score buyers. If h?" − $" 2""~∗ − ($# + ?#)(2#"~∗ + cda/bcdaaea ) , then the two will be both score sellers. We are 
especially interested in the situation when one company is the score seller and the other is the score 
buyer. This requires the term ($# + ?#)	cda/bcdaaea  to be large enough to turn the positive equation 
(32a) into negative. Such relationship can be shown below: Z[#" − Z[## > '%/b)/)a^%a Q#2""~∗ − Q#2#"~∗                                        (33) 
 23 
Equation (33) implies that in order to become a score seller, given that firm 1 is a score buyer, firm 
2 need to have a small enough variable cost for NEV. In conclusion, after applying the policy, 
automakers with a large enough comparative advantage on NEV tend to specialize in that area and 
thus become score sellers to maximize their profits. The others, however, are going to become 
score buyers to make producing NEV less like a burden. 
7. Conclusion 
Three models have been adopted to study the effect of the double score policy on car 
producers’ sales mix, the one-company model, the two-company model, and the two-company-
two-car model. All three models are built based on Kwoka’s model studying the analogous CAFE 
regulation (1983), and use the same fixed demand functions for two types of cars, new energy 
vehicle and traditional energy vehicle. Additionally, the efficacy of the policy is obtained by 
computing the difference of firms’ optimal production quantities before and after the policy is 
implemented. They are applicable to different scenarios. 
The one-company model focuses on the impacts of the fuel consumption score constraint 
as well as the new energy score constraint. We find that since the two constraint are both linear, 
they have similar functions to the firm. Furthermore, we find the intuitive conclusion derived by 
following Kwoka’s method that the single firm will produce more NEV and less TEV in order to 
meet the constraints to be only valid when 0 < !"!# < 2, as shown by equations (17). When 2 <!"!# < 4, we are unable to exclude other possible outcomes because the signs of quantities 
difference are uncertain, even though we may show that the result is likely to be the same as the 
former situation. As for the remedial mechanism of the policy, in one-company model the firm can 
only use its own new energy score to offset its negative fuel consumption score. The method turns 
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out to make the constraint easier to comply with by lowering the ratio between quantities in the 
constraint. 
The two-company model studies the trading of the new energy score by including two firms 
in the model, one producing NEV only and the other TEV. Similarly, indicated by equations (24), 
the effect of the policy on the two vehicle companies’ sales mix is still uncertain, and will be 
absolute only when 0 < !"!# < 2. We also notice that the price of the score will be equal to the 
marginal cost when the policy is tightened. The score trading, as a method of the remedial 
mechanism, will also relax the constraint exerted by the policy. 
Finally, the two-company-two-car model can be viewed as combing the previous two 
models. It has two companies manufacturing both TEV and NEV. In addition, to show its 
comparative advantage on NEV, one firm will have a lower NEV unit cost. We discover that such 
comparative advantage will help the firm to produce more NEV when reach the equilibrium point 
in the control group. However, the double score policy has no influence on the discrepancy in NEV 
quantities, as the difference will remain the same when including the policy into the model. 
Additionally, as can be viewed in equations (30), although the effect of the policy on producers’ 
sales mixes continues to be unclear, we find that it is more likely for the companies to produce 
more NEV and less TEV to meet the constraints, as the range extends to 0 < !"!# < 3 to keep the 
signs of the difference strictly negative for TEV and positive for NEV. Meanwhile, the part in the 
numerator for TEV that is absolutely negative and the positive part for NEV difference are also 
weighted more heavily as their coefficients now double. Last but not the least, equation (33) shows 
that under the condition of the policy, if the firm possesses a large enough comparative advantage 
on NEV production, it will be the score seller. 
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